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In Part One of this two-part series we considered the ways in which international investment 
agreements (IIAs) and the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism contained therein 
are not effective, or at least not optimally effective, at advancing the four often-cited objectives of 
IIAs and ISDS:2 (1) promoting investment flows; (2) depoliticizing disputes; (3) promoting the rule 
of law; and (4) providing compensation for harms to investors. We also touched on the important 
question of whether the objectives themselves should be fundamentally revisited to meet 21st 
century needs and priorities, including the Sustainable Development Goals.3  
 
Here, we consider four alternative approaches to ISDS – whether under ad hoc arbitration or a more 
permanent body, such as an “investment court” – that, when used alone or in combination, might 
better serve the oft-stated objectives, looking in particular at how those alternatives might advance 
revisited objectives, aligned with 21st century priorities. These alternatives include: 
• strengthening domestic legal systems,  
• the use of risk insurance by investors, 
• using state-state cooperation and dispute settlement mechanisms, and  
• using existing human rights mechanisms for certain kinds of redress.  
 
The actual and potential roles of these alternatives raise questions about continued reliance on ISDS, 
challenging assumptions that ISDS is necessary or even optimal for sound investment promotion or 
governance aims. Rather than continuing to integrate ISDS within investment treaties, it is therefore 
important to take a closer look at these alternatives, their complementary functions, and their 
advantages and disadvantages as tools to support modern, and even traditional, objectives.    
Strengthening Domestic Legal Systems 
 
Efforts to strengthen domestic legal systems can be made and implemented on a unilateral basis. 
However, treaties could also play a role in supporting, monitoring, and enforcing those efforts. 
Treaties could, for example, establish: 
 
• an agreed definition of the “rule of law” to be employed by treaty parties in the context of 
the agreement, and commitments by the states to uphold and promote the rule of law as 
defined; 
• commitments and/or mechanisms for financial and/or technical assistance to build capacity, 
or cooperation to identify or address existing issues regarding domestic rule of law; 
• mechanisms for monitoring the rule of law;  
• triggers for dialogue between the states, or dialogue between the states and a treaty body or 
expert institution in order to address identified issues;  
																																																								
2 Lise Johnson, Brooke Güven, Jesse Coleman, 'Investor-State Dispute Settlement: What Are We Trying to 
Achieve? Does ISDS Get us There?' (Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, 11 December 2017) < 
ccsi.columbia.edu/2017/12/11/investor-state-dispute-settlement-what-are-we-trying-to-achieve-does-isds-
get-us-there/> accessed 1 April 2019. 
3  For an extensive discussion of how IIAs and their dispute settlement mechanisms align with the 
development objectives of governments, see Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs, Nathan Lobel, ‘Aligning International 
Investment Agreements with the Sustainable Development Goals’ forthcoming 2019; see also Emma Aisbett, 
Bernali Choudhury, Olivier de Schutter, Frank Garcia, James Harrison, Song Hong, Lise Johnson, 
Mouhamadou Kane, Santiago Peña, Matthew Porterfield, Susan Sell, Stephen E. Shay, Louis T. Wells, 
‘Rethinking International Investment Governance: Principles for the 21st Century’ (2018).  
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• an independent body responsible for issuing reports on the rule of law in the treaty parties; 
and/or 
• mechanisms for enforcement of rule of law standards and commitments, and/or sanctions 
for non-compliance. 
 
One example of a treaty-based mechanism for addressing rule of law challenges can be found in 
the EU: under Article 7 TEU4 and the Framework on the Rule of Law,5 the European Commission 
can address, among other concerns, serious and systemic rule of law failures.  
 
As compared to ISDS, which only is relevant when rule of law failures negatively impact foreign 
investors, treaty mechanisms to strengthen domestic legal systems would improve domestic rule 
of law for all stakeholders, and would commit treaty parties to address rule of law problems 
irrespective of which stakeholder group was negatively impacted. 
 
Insofar as a strong and stable domestic judicial system is a consideration for investors when making 
locational investment decisions, such efforts to strengthen the domestic judicial system and 
corresponding institutions should improve the attractiveness of host governments for increased 
foreign investment and continued reinvestment. 
 
Implementing this alternative would likely entail and, indeed, depend upon inter-state diplomatic 
engagement, particularly but not only when one country adopts measures that negatively impact 
the investors of another country. Thus, this approach may not de-politicize all investor-state 
disputes that arise; nevertheless, as noted in our earlier piece on the objectives of ISDS, 
																																																								
4 “1.   On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the European Parliament or by the 
European Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its members after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament, may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member 
State of the values referred to in Article 2. Before making such a determination, the Council shall hear the 
Member State in question and may address recommendations to it, acting in accordance with the same 
procedure. 
The Council shall regularly verify that the grounds on which such a determination was made continue to 
apply. 
2.   The European Council, acting by unanimity on a proposal by one third of the Member States or by the 
Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may determine the existence of a 
serious and persistent breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2, after inviting the 
Member State in question to submit its observations. 
3.   Where a determination under paragraph 2 has been made, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, 
may decide to suspend certain of the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to the Member State 
in question, including the voting rights of the representative of the government of that Member State in the 
Council. In doing so, the Council shall take into account the possible consequences of such a suspension on 
the rights and obligations of natural and legal persons. 
The obligations of the Member State in question under the Treaties shall in any case continue to be binding 
on that State. 
4.   The Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide subsequently to vary or revoke measures taken 
under paragraph 3 in response to changes in the situation which led to their being imposed. 
5.   The voting arrangements applying to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council 
for the purposes of this Article are laid down in Article 354 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union.” 
5  ‘Effective Justice’ (European Commission) <ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-
rights/effective-justice_en> accessed 1 April 2019. 
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“politicization” is not necessarily bad. It is not synonymous with “gunboat diplomacy”6 of the past 
and can be useful for finding reasonable solutions to disputes.7 Giving governments a framework 
and tools for systematically addressing rule of law matters may also help improve political dialogue 
on these issues. 
 
Efforts to help improve domestic rule of law, such as those in place in the EU, are designed to 
address systemic failures; in contrast to ISDS, they are not designed to provide monetary or other 
relief in particular cases to particular aggrieved individuals or entities. Thus, such dedicated 
systems for establishing and maintaining the rule of law for all stakeholders, including investors, 
may not score as high on the “providing aggrieved investors compensation” objective as ISDS 
currently does. Indeed, IIAs and ISDS provide covered investors greater rights than are available 
under domestic legal systems, including legal systems with relatively strong, independent courts 
and property rights protections.8 Thus, doing away with those IIA/ISDS preferences and focusing 
instead on ensuring effective access to protections and remedies available under domestic law may 
narrow the claims investors are permitted to bring against states and the financial awards they can 
recover. But, as discussed further in our blog on objectives, that outcome – reducing the scope of 
potential claims and financial awards – may not be bad, as the relatively broad powers ISDS 
provides investors to sue and recover damages from states arguably do not make sound policy 
sense.9  
 
Additionally, a more solid foundation for the rule of law and strengthened domestic institutions 
may prevent some losses in the first place, and may be particularly important for domestic 
citizens and companies (e.g., the employees, suppliers, and consumers of foreign invested firms 
whose economic and social well-being and confidence can be crucial to foreign investors’ interest 
and success), as well as for small- and medium-sized foreign investors for whom ISDS is likely 
impractical due to the costs and duration of such cases. 	
																																																								
6  Geoffrey Gertz, Srividya Jandhyala, Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, ‘Legalization, Diplomacy, And 
Development: Do Investment Treaties De-Politicize Investment Disputes?’ (2018) 107 World Development 
238. 
7  Jason Yackee, ‘Politicized Dispute Settlement in the Pre-Investment Treaty Era: A Micro-Historical 
Approach’ [2017] Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1412. 
8 See, e.g., ‘Opening Statement of USTR Robert Lighthizer to the House Ways and Means Committee’ 
(Office of the United States Trade Representative, 21 March 2018) <ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/press-releases/2018/march/opening-statement-ustr-robert> accessed 1 April 2019 (noting that ISDS 
provides foreign investors greater rights than domestic investors); Shawn Nichols, ‘Expanding Property 
Rights Under Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Class Struggle In The Era Of Transnational Capital’ 
(2018) 25(2) Review of International Political Economy 243; Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs, Jeffrey Sachs, 
‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Public Interest and US Domestic Law’ (2015) CCSI Policy Paper < 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/05/Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement-Public-Interest-and-U.S.-
Domestic-Law-FINAL-May-19-8.pdf> accessed 1 April 2019; David Gaukrodger, ‘Investment Treaties and 
Shareholder Claims for Reflective Loss: Insights from Advanced Systems of Corporate Law’ (2014) OECD 
Working Papers on International Investment 2014/2 < http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-
2014_02.pdf> accessed 1 April 2019. 
9 See, e.g., Robert Howse, ‘International Investment Law and Arbitration: A Conceptual Framework’ (2017) 
Institute for International Law and Justice Working Paper 2017/1 <https://www.iilj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/Howse_IILJ_2017_1-MegaReg.pdf> accessed 1 April 2019 (discussing concerns 
regarding approaches to compensation for losses due to regulatory activity). 
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Political and Other Risk Insurance 
 
Political risk insurance10 (PRI) covers political events11 and the direct and indirect actions of host 
governments including: expropriation, currency inconvertibility, transfers restriction, political 
violence (war, terrorism, civil disturbance), breach of contract, and arbitration award default. Some 
providers also offer insurance protection for certain regulatory risks12 including material changes to 
feed-in-tariff schemes, critical changes to taxation or other regulations affecting the project’s ability 
to operate, and revocation of necessary licenses or permits. Companies may also be able to secure 
insurance for losses associated with government penalties and fines, exposure due to mistaken and 
overly aggressive tax positions, critical changes to taxation, and liability to private parties for 
environmental or other torts.13 
 
Each of those types of risks has been the subject of a successful ISDS claim.14 Given that the risk 
insurance (RI) market – which includes both political risk insurance and other commercial risk 
insurance available through private sector providers – may offer protections that are also offered by 
investment treaties and ISDS, it is important to consider whether and how the costs and benefits of 
RI for those risks compares with ISDS.  
 
This alternative is perhaps most relevant to the goal of investment promotion. RI, like ISDS, can 
potentially encourage investment that would have otherwise been deterred due to concerns about 
risk. However, unlike ISDS, which effectively acts as broad, exclusion-free and premium-free RI,15 
RI requires the investor, at least to some extent, to internalize the costs of the risk it is taking. Based 
on the cost of premiums, limitations on insurance, and/or exclusions from coverage, RI, can send 
important market-based signals about the riskiness of any particular investment or investment 
location. In some cases, it makes policy sense to ensure those signals regarding risk are strong. It 
would be hard to make a policy case, for instance, that we should be shielding investors from the 
																																																								
10  Kathryn Gordon, ‘Investment Guarantees and Political Risk Insurance: Institutions, Incentives and 
Development’ [2008] OECD Investment Policy Perspectives, 91. 
11 World Investment and Political Risk 2013. Washington, DC: MIGA, World Bank Group. 
12 ‘Regulatory Risk’ (OPIC) <www.opic.gov/what-we-offer/political-risk-insurance/types-of-
coverage/regulatory-risk> accessed 1 April 2019. 
13  See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, Kyle Logue, ‘Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral 
Hazard’ (2012) 111 Michigan Law Review 197; Kyle D. Logue, ‘Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax 
Insurance’ (2005) 25 Virginia Tax Review 339. 
14 See, e.g., Novenergia II – Energy & Environment (SCA) v Spain, SCC Case No 2015/063, Final Arbitral 
Award (February 15, 2018) (finding a breach of the FET obligation relating to a reduction in subsidies for 
renewable energy projects); Perenco v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Remaining Issues 
of Jurisdiction and on Liability, September 12, 2014 (holding Ecuador liable adoption of “windfall profits” 
taxes); Bear Creek v. Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/2, Award,  November 30, 2017 (finding Peru liable for 
revocation of an authorization necessary to hold and develop a mining concession); Occidental Petroleum 
Corporation v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, October 5, 2012 (finding Ecuador liable for 
exercising contractual termination clause on the ground that it was a disproportionate response or too 
punitive); Chevron v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA 2009-23, Second Partial Award on Track II, August 30, 
2018 (finding, inter alia, that the government violated the investment treaty by allowing tort plaintiffs’ claims 
against Chevron to proceed in court); Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. Russia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case 
No. AA 226, Final Award, July 18, 2014 (finding the government liable for its response to the claimant’s 
aggressive tax strategies); Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. Russia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 
AA 227, Final Award, July 18, 2014 (same); Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. Russia, UNCITRAL, 
PCA Case No. AA 228, Final Award, July 18, 2014 (same).   
15  Phil Levy, ‘Critique of NAFTA Provision Highlights Team Trump's Misconceptions on Investment 
Abroad’ (Forbes, 23 October 2017) <www.forbes.com/sites/phillevy/2017/10/23/should-team-trump-
encourage-investment-in-mexico/#1268a86f70b4> accessed 1 April 2019.   
 6 
risk that future government regulation will require stranding of their fossil fuel assets; or that we 
should be shielding companies adopting aggressive tax planning strategies from the risk that 
governments will modify laws (or interpretation thereof) to combat base erosion and profit shifting. 
In other cases, we may indeed want to decrease risk, for instance to encourage sustainable 
investment into conflict-afflicted regions, or to support use of innovative technologies or practices.  
 
Policy discussions of insurance therefore often involve complex but fundamental questions 
regarding what types of behavior insurance should and should not encourage and how to avoid 
moral hazards promoting undesirable risk-taking. While these issues are central in discourse on 
insurance and insurance regulation, they rarely figure in discussions of investment treaties and 
ISDS. Investment treaties and ISDS generally protect – and therefore presumably aim to promote 
- investments irrespective of their activities or impacts. There is little, if any, consideration of the 
moral hazards that might be created for investors by protecting them from – or giving them 
powerful tools to combat – a broad range of risks such as changes in tax law, policies halting new 
fossil fuel projects, and tort claims brought by domestic citizens. 
 
Relatedly, investments supported by RI may be more likely to provide sustainable development 
benefits in their host countries (or, at least, not cause harms). This is crucial due to the fact that, as 
noted in the discussion on objectives, not all foreign investment is beneficial for host (or home) 
countries and therefore worth promoting. RI providers (who are themselves subject to human rights 
obligations)16 can specifically require compliance with certain international human rights, anti-
corruption, environmental and other sustainable development norms. For example, OPIC, the 
United States Government’s overseas political risk insurance provider, imposes on policy holders 
standards relating to the environment, labor, human rights, and the development effects in the host 
state.17 Indeed, as noted by some commentators, both public and private insurers can play a crucial 
quasi-regulatory role to help improve the conduct, and reduce the undesirable risk-taking, of their 
insured.18 Due to the knowledge and expertise they have about the conduct of their policyholders 
and the factors giving rise to risks, their incentives to limit payouts, and their ability to set premiums 
and other contract terms, RI providers can develop and encourage adherence to best practices in 
the range of areas they cover.19 Therefore, unlike with ISDS, with RI, risk is assessed based on the 
specific investment, the investor internalizes some of this risk through premiums, deductibles, and 
exclusions, and sustainable development norms can be more meaningfully encouraged, monitored 
and enforced. 
 
In terms of impacts on domestic rule of law, there are some ways RI can potentially help improve 
domestic legal systems, or at least avoid rewarding substandard conduct. Authoritarian governments 
can use ISDS to reduce the riskiness of doing business in their territories without engaging in any 
																																																								
16 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect And Remedy" Framework’ (UN 2011) 
<https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf> accessed 1 April 
2019.  
17 ‘Political Risk Insurance’ (OPIC) <www.opic.gov/content/eligibility> accessed 1 April 2019. 
18 Omri Ben-Shahar, Kyle Logue, ‘Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard’ (2012) 
111 Michigan Law Review 197; Kernaghan Webb, ‘Political Risk Insurance and the Mining Sector: An 
Analysis of the Regulatory Effects of Contracts’ (2012) 54 International Journal of Law and Management 
394; Howard Kunreuther, Matthew W. White and Haitao Yin, ‘Risk-Based Pricing and Risk-Reducing 
Effort: Does the Private Insurance Market Reduce Environmental Accidents?’ (2011) 54 Journal of Law and 
Economics 325; Christian Lahnstein, ‘Tort Law and the Ethical Responsibilities of Liability Insurers: 
Comments from a Reinsurer’s Perspective’ (2011) 103 Journal of Business Ethics 87, 91, 93..  
19 See sources cited supra n. 18. 
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real domestic legal reforms.20 Governments can cater to and capture benefits offered by foreign 
investors (e.g., through signing bonuses for contracts, tax and royalty payments, and bribery), while 
suppressing the rights and voices of their domestic citizens. When an investor is covered by an 
investment treaty and ISDS, it benefits from a set of legal protections and tools that largely insulates 
the investor from the domestic legal context, and pays nothing for that protection. In contrast, the 
price of RI will vary based on the host country, where higher prices charged for insurance in risky 
countries compared to less risky countries may serve to help channel investment away from the 
riskiest destinations and toward the better governed ones. While RI generally may make investors 
more willing to invest in risky locations, pricing of RI can still make investing in certain locations 
undesirable. This, in turn, and in contrast to ISDS, can send host governments signals that if they 
want to attract investment, they need to improve their domestic climates.  
 
Looking at impacts on state-state relations, in some cases, risk insurance – particularly 
government-provided political risk insurance – might give rise to politicization. While host 
government action triggering an insurance claim or payout may not spur home government 
involvement if the insurance provider is a private company, the situation may be different if the 
insurance provider is an entity of the home country, such as the United States’ OPIC,21 or a 
multilateral public RI provider, such as the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency.22 From the perspective of the investor, however, the dispute would not be “politicized”: 
as with ISDS, an investor covered by RI can decide whether and when to bring a claim for 
compensation for covered losses (subject to the terms of its policies), and the investor’s recovery 
would not depend on its home government to pursue a claim. If the RI provider is a government 
entity, however, the investor may be able to benefit from some “political” engagement as there are 
indications that the actual or potential involvement of home country or multilateral risk insurance 
providers can be helpful in resolving or avoiding investment disputes.23 Thus, as noted above, de-
politicization may not always be the right objective as judged from the perspective of different 
stakeholders.   
 
Finally, with respect to the objective of investor compensation, risk insurance offers advantages 
and disadvantages as compared with ISDS. RI may decrease the likelihood of harms because of 
project selection and coverage criteria, and engagement with investors and host governments. 
Additionally, when a loss does occur, litigation over whether and what payment is due may be less 
costly and lengthy as those issues would be governed by contractual provisions that are more 
specific and certain than the infamously vague standards of IIAs. Disadvantages from the 
perspective of the investor include that recovery under an insurance policy may be subject to caps 
and other contractual limitations not in place under investment treaties; grounds for recovery may 
be narrower than protections under investment treaties; exhaustion of remedies may be required 
under the insurance contract as a condition of filing a claim for compensation; and recovery will 
need to take into account premiums and/or deductibles paid. While such limits are not necessarily 
best-case options for individual investors, they may have important policy and practical rationales, 
such as avoiding moral hazards, as discussed above. 
																																																								
20  See, e.g., Eric Arias, ‘Cooperative Autocracies: Leader Survival, Creditworthiness, and Bilateral 
Investment Treaties’ (2018) 62 American Journal of Political Science 905; Mark Fathi Massoud, 
‘International Arbitration And Judicial Politics In Authoritarian States’ (2014) 39 Law & Social Inquiry 1. 
21 <www.opic.gov/> accessed 1 April 2019. 
22 <www.miga.org/> accessed 1 April 2019. 
23  Efraim Chalamish, Robert Howse, ‘Conceptualizing Political Risk Insurance: Toward a Legal and 
Economic Analysis of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)' in Mathias Audit, Stephan 
Schill (eds), Transnational Law of Public Contracts (Bruylant 2016). 
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State-state Dispute Settlement 
 
State-state dispute settlement clauses that allow states to initiate claims against their treaty-partners 
with respect to harm to investors already exist in many investment treaties, sometimes alone, but 
more commonly alongside ISDS.24 In addition, some matters are expressly carved out of ISDS 
provisions and left to states to resolve exclusively or before the issues can proceed to ISDS. These 
carve-outs serve to narrow the role of ISDS and put more control over designated issues or policy 
areas into the hands of states for political and/or legalized dispute resolution by domestic officials 
and/or treaty bodies. States have done this for particularly complex or sensitive areas, such as 
financial services, tax measures, ad-hoc issues such as tobacco controls, and potentially broad 
categories of “public welfare” measures.25 
 
New Alternatives Re-examining “Political” Resolutions 
 
While the incorporation of ISDS into IIAs was based, in large part, on the desire to “depoliticize” 
investment disputes and remove the home-state from involvement, the reality and desirability of this 
premise is increasingly being questioned and some very recent treaties have incorporated new 
thinking on the role for states in investment disputes. Brazil, for example, has been promoting and 
signing a breed of investment treaties (Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreements (CIFAs)) 
that rely entirely on inter-state mechanisms to identify, avoid, and resolve barriers to cross-border 
investment and disputes between investors and states.26 Brazil’s CIFAs focus on cooperation and 
investment facilitation and promote amicable dispute settlement with state-state dispute resolution as 
a last resort. The CIFAs create a joint governmental committee that monitors and implements the 
CIFA, and also has a mandate to coordinate investment cooperation among governments, the private 
sector and civil society, including preventing and resolving conflicts in an amicable way.27 Each party 
to a CIFA is required to establish an ombudsman to provide support to foreign investors and to 
provide information or assistance with domestic legal or treaty issues.28 When a dispute does arise, 
and if mandatory governmental consultations and negotiations surrounding disputes fail, a party is 
permitted to initiate a proceeding before the joint committee in which the investor, government 
agencies and civil society are permitted to participate.29 In replacing ISDS with a joint governmental 




Regarding impacts on investment flows, the ways that state-state dispute settlement would 
potentially influence investment flows – by providing a signaling function, demonstrating a 
credible commitment, and impacting the rule of law – align with the theories regarding why ISDS 
might influence investor decisions, though there are some differences. With state-state dispute 
																																																								
24  Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, ‘State-State Dispute Settlement In Investment Treaties’ in Kavaljit 
Singh, Burghard Ilge (eds) Rethinking Bilateral Investment Treaties (Both Ends, Madhyam, SOMO 2014). 
25 See, e.g., Australia-China FTA, arts. 9.11(4)-(8), 9.19; Australia-Hong Kong Investment Agreement, art. 
13(5). 
26 Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Martin Dietrich Brauch, ‘Brazil’s Innovative Approach to International 
Investment Law’ (IISD Blog, 15 September 2015) <www.iisd.org/blog/brazils-innovative-approach-
international-investment-law> accessed 1 April 2019; Martin Dietrich Brauch, ‘The Brazil-Mozambique and 
Brazil-Angola Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreements (CIFAs): A Descriptive Overview’ 
(Investment Treaty News, 21 May 2015) <www.iisd.org/itn/2015/05/21/the-brazil-mozambique-and-brazil-






settlement, the enforceability of the commitment may not be as strong, as the number of potential 
claimants is reduced. On the other hand, some have found that ISDS claims against a host state 
(even claims that are ultimately unsuccessful) are linked to a drop in FDI in that state.30 If the claims 
are based on an interpretation of treaty obligations that go beyond what the state parties to the treaty 
intended, then the existence ISDS cases may be poor and overbroad proxies for whether states’ 
commitments to investors are in fact credible. In tension with the increasing-investment-flows 
objective, this means that ISDS can potentially do undue reputational harm to host countries, 
causing drops in FDI for even treaty-compliant conduct. State-state dispute settlement could help 
avoid this outcome by producing fewer claims alleging unduly broad interpretations of IIA 
commitments.  
	
With respect to domestic rule of law, state-state mechanisms (such as that established in the EU to 
address systemic rule of law challenges in EU Member States) can play a better role in supporting 
just, effective and rule-based domestic governance.  
 
In terms of the “depoliticization” objective, here, as well, state-state dispute settlement could offer 
some advantages over ISDS. The introduction of ISDS into IIAs is said to have been motivated in 
part by eliminating the “political” role of home states in determining whether to bring or settle 
cases, and in preventing home-host state relations from being soured by investor-state disputes. 
Depoliticization can be useful to the investor (who, with ISDS, is relatively free to bring claims 
irrespective of its home state’s support or approval), the home state (who, with ISDS, can tell its 
investors it won’t engage on their behalf, focusing on other diplomatic priorities), and the host state 
(who, with ISDS, can resolve investor-state disputes in legalized dispute settlement free from added 
pressure by home states).  
 
Commentators are increasingly questioning whether it is prudent, desirable, and even possible,31 to 
truly depoliticize investment disputes by eliminating participation by home states in relation to 
claims of their investors (see box). There may, instead, be reasons for placing different types of 
disputes at different places along the spectrum between purely political, and strictly legalized, 
dispute resolution; indeed, evidence from other fora demonstrate that state-state disputes can still 
be “legalized”.32  
 
State-state mechanisms (including domestic law and policy to implement those mechanisms) could 
also be designed to better ensure that decisions on whether to advance cases are taken on objective, 
principled and merit-based grounds, and not, for instance, on capture and cronyism, in which those 
companies with the greatest political connections and clout are most likely to secure home country 
support. There could be criteria and procedures adopted at the domestic level to govern, for 
instance, whether or when a state should or should not pursue claims of one of its investors or a 
																																																								
30 Emma Aisbett, Matthias Busse, and Peter Nunnenkamp, ‘Investment Treaties as Deterrents of Host-
Country Discretion: The Impact of Investor-State Disputes on Foreign Direct Investment in Developing 
Countries’ (2018) 154 Review of World Economics 119; Todd Allee and Clint Peinhardt. ‘Contingent 
Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment’ (2011) 65 
International Organization 401. 
31 Theodore Posner, Marguerite Walter, ‘The Abiding Role of State-State Engagement in the Resolution of 
Investor-State Disputes’ in Jean E. Kalicki, Anna Joubin-Bret (eds), Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement System (Brill Nijhoff 2015). 
32 Kenneth Abbott, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal, ‘The 
Concept of Legalization’ (2000) 54(3) International Organization 401. 
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class of investors, transparency regarding decisions, and structural mechanisms for insulating those 
decisions from political pressure.33  
 
Additionally, once a case has been initiated, treaties could establish strictly legalized dispute 
resolution systems so that matters are resolved based on the rule of law rather than on power, or 
variations that include more political aspects, depending, for instance, on the type of claim. As 
noted above, state investment treaty practice currently reflects an interest by states in retaining a 
political role for some important and sensitive issues,34 while also establishing a mechanism for 
legalized dispute resolution of others.  
 
Importantly, thoughtful improvements to state-state consultation and dispute settlement 
mechanisms can improve outcomes not only for investors (for whom ISDS is not necessarily 
attractive or feasible), but also for host states. Host states continue to face political pressure 
notwithstanding the availability of ISDS,35 and also face uncertainty regarding whether the home 
state will or will not intervene in ISDS disputes to address issues of treaty interpretation. 36 
Thoughtful approaches to state-state dispute settlement can also better account for the broader 
interests sought to be protected by treaties’ environmental, labor, human rights, and governance-
related provisions. There have been important studies documenting the failed promise of these 
sustainable development-related provisions, highlighting the limited effectiveness and utility to 
date of state-state mechanisms for raising and resolving broader environmental and social interests 
and concerns that can be caused and exacerbated by the treaties’ liberalization and protection 
provisions. 37  Thus, reformed and updated approaches to state-state engagement and dispute 
settlement could help address a range of issues and priorities held by various state and non-state 
actors. 
 
Finally, in terms of securing compensation for losses, it is plausible that some investors will judge 
state-state dispute mechanisms less favorably than ISDS. States do, and under a state-state system 
may remain likely to, bring fewer claims than investors would under the same circumstances. As 
such, to the extent that investors win awards in ISDS cases (which is the case) a transition to a state-
state system may have a negative impact on investors’ ability to secure financial awards. But there 
may also be advantages for investors seeking relief. 38 In addition to enabling the investor to stay 
behind-the-scenes, state-state proceedings could be used, for instance, to secure declaratory 
																																																								
33 See Gordon Christenson, ‘International Claims Procedure Before the Department of State’ (1961) 13 
Syracuse Law Review 527, 531–32.  
34 See, e.g., Australia-China FTA, arts. 9.11(4)-(8), 9.19. 
35 See, e.g., Public Eye, Glivec in Colombia: New Leaked Letter from Novartis Attests to Pressure at the 
Highest Level (5 February 2018), 	https://www.publiceye.ch/en/news/detail/glivec-in-colombia-new-leaked-
letter-from-novartis-attests-to-pressure-at-highest-level 
36 See Lise Johnson and Lisa Sachs, ‘Inconsistency’s Many Forms in Investor-State Dispute Settlement and 
Implications for Reform’ 7 (CCSI Policy Paper, November 2018). 
37 See, e.g., James Harrison, et al., ‘Governing Labour Standards through Free Trade Agreements: Limits of 
the European Union’s Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters’ (2019) 57 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 260, 269-270; Clint Peinhardt, Alisha A. Kim, and Viveca Pavon-Harr, ‘Deforestation and theUnited 
States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (2019) 19 Global Environmental Politics 52; Franz Christian Ebert 
& Pedro A. Villarreal, ‘The Renegotiated “NAFTA”: What Is In It for Labor Rights?’ (EJIL: Talk! 11 
October 2018); United States Government Accountability Office, Free Trade Agreements: Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative Should Continue to Improve Its Monitoring of Environmental Commitments, (Report 
to Congressional Requesters, November 2014); United States Government Accountability Office, Free Trade 
Agreements: U.S. Partners Are Addressing Labor Commitments, but More Monitoring and Enforcement Are 
Needed, (Report to Congressional Requesters, November 2014). 
38 Supra n. 27. 
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judgment that a certain domestic measure in the host state is inconsistent with the treaty. That, in 
turn, could help advance domestic reform for the benefit of a broader class of investors, not just the 
claimants. This might be especially important for small investors, or when the challenged measure 
has low or minimal dollar-value effects. State-state actions for declaratory relief might also make 
it easier for individual investors to seek remedies before the host state’s courts, human rights fora, 
or under political risk insurance.  
 
Similarly, state-state mechanisms could be used to reach a global settlement of all claims by the 
home state’s investors impacted by the host state’s conduct, and potentially distribute the benefits 
of that settlement to affected investors. The state could also use state-state mechanisms to establish 
claims proceedings in particular circumstances. 
 
Thus, despite perceptions that investors prefer to go-it-alone without interference by their home 
states, that home states use investment treaties to resist their investors’ requests to provide 
diplomatic support, and that home states’ engagement with host states is always forceful and 
undesirable, reality paints a more nuanced picture, demonstrating an existing and potentially 
increasing role for home states in helping investors secure relief in investor-state disputes.  
Human Rights Mechanisms 
 
Much like ISDS, the range of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms established under 
international human rights treaties are notable within the broader sphere of public international law 
for providing beneficiaries with direct rights of action against states, despite the fact that, like 
investors, human rights petitioners are generally not considered “subjects” of public international 
law.39 Resort by investors to human rights mechanisms may thus be appropriate in certain limited 
circumstances where fundamental rights have been infringed. This alternative could complement 
the availability of other options discussed in this working paper, such as state-state mechanisms, 
by creating a “fallback guarantee” in the context of egregious acts or omissions committed by host 
states with respect to investors, including cases involving denials of justice.  
 
With respect to encouraging investment flows, a host state’s compliance with human rights law, 
coupled with the availability of human rights monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, could be 
argued to create similar perceptions or “signals” regarding the rule of law, transparent legal 
frameworks, and credible commitments concerning these standards, as are alleged of IIAs. Indeed, 
the links between human rights law and improvement of the rule of law in host states are likely to 
be stronger and more positive than those argued to exist between ISDS and domestic rule of law.  
 
Parallels can also be drawn between the depoliticization aims of ISDS and the depoliticization of 
human rights cases. Like ISDS, human rights law seeks to insulate consideration of cases and 
enforcement of states’ obligations from interference by political pressures and interests. It provides 
individuals, groups, and (in some cases) legal entities with direct rights of action against states. 
While diplomatic and political interests and pressures can play a role in the determinations rendered 
by human rights tribunals and other authorities, and in the enforcement of those determinations, the 
limited research available on depoliticization in ISDS suggests that there, too, political engagement 
may continue alongside, and not be entirely replaced by, private actors’ direct rights of action 
against states. 40  In both systems, the questions therefore relate to understanding 
																																																								
39 James Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, Oxford University Press 
2012) 121-123.  
40 Supra n. 5. 
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desirable/undesirable relationships between diplomatic engagement and legalized claims, and how 
to govern those relationships effectively. 
 
With respect to the objective of strengthening rule of law, human rights mechanisms specifically 
prioritize the strengthening of domestic governance for all stakeholders.41 From a procedural 
perspective, claimants must exhaust local remedies prior to bringing a grievance before a human 
rights tribunal or UN treaty body, unless they can justify non-exhaustion on specific grounds.42 
This requirement gives domestic judicial systems and institutions the opportunity and the incentive 
to rectify a harm caused, both with respect to a specific case and more generally regarding 
improvement of domestic legal and regulatory frameworks or processes. By contrast, exhaustion 
of local remedies is required by a relatively small number of IIAs,43 and ISDS creates a substitute 
system for the determination or settlement of investment disputes that can undermine – or at least 
dis-incentivize – strengthening of legal and other institutions at the domestic level.  
 
Moreover, protection under international human rights law is not contingent on nationality nor on 
possession of certain economic assets. As a result, the rule of law concerns that ISDS raises – 
concerns relating to unequal access to justice and inequality under the law44 – do not arise in the 
context of human rights law and related enforcement mechanisms.  
 
With respect to the objective of providing compensation, international human rights law requires 
that states must provide effective remedies for violated rights. The ICCPR, for example, requires 
state parties to “ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated 
shall have an effective remedy.”45 The Human Rights Committee underscored the importance of 
reparation under international human rights law, noting that “[w]ithout reparation… the obligation 
to provide an effective remedy… is not discharged.”46 The right to an effective remedy is also 
																																																								
41 See e.g., Veronika Fikfak, ‘Judicial Strategies and their Impact on the Development of the International 
Rule of Law’ in Machiko Kanetake and André Nollkaemper (eds), The Rule of Law at the National and 
International Levels: Contestations and Deference (Hart Publishing 2014); André Nollkaemper, National 
Courts and the International Rule of Law (Oxford University Press 2011).   
42 ECHR, art. 35(1) requires exhaustion of “all domestic remedies” that “relate to the breaches alleged and at 
the same time are available and sufficient,” both in theory and practice. Exhaustion requirements are also 
included in ACHR art. 46(1) and ACHPR arts. 50, 56(5). Claimants must also exhaust domestic remedies 
prior to submitting a claim to UN treaty bodies. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights ‘Individual Complaint Procedures under the United Nations Human Rights Treaties’ (UN 
2013) <www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet7Rev.2.pdf> accessed 1 April 2019. 
43 See David Gaukrodger, Kathryn Gordon, ‘Investor- State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the 
Investment Policy Community’ (2012) OECD Working Paper on International Investment 2012/3, 15 
<www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2012_3.pdf> accessed 1 April 2019 (this 2012 study found 
that only 8% of a sample of 1,660 IIAs included exhaustion of local remedies as a precondition to bringing a 
claim before an investment tribunal). On exhaustion requirements in recently negotiated treaties, see Lise 
Johnson, Lisa Sachs, and Jesse Coleman, ‘International Investment Agreements, 2014: A Review of Trends 
and Approaches’ in Andrea Bjorklund (ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy (OUP 2016) 
46-48.  
44 Lisa Sachs, Lise Johnson, ‘Investment Treaties, Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Inequality: How 
International Rules and Institutions Can Exacerbate Domestic Disparities’ in José Antonio Ocampo 
(ed), International Rules and Inequality: Implications for Global Economic Governance (Columbia 
University Press 2019); See also ‘Access to Justice’ (Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment) 
<ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/access-to-justice/> accessed 1 April 2019. 
45 ICCPR, art. 2(3).  
46 UN Human Rights Committee ‘General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant General Comment’ 26 May 2004  CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13  31, 
paras. 15-17.  
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enshrined in regional and other international human rights instruments.47 While ISDS has tended 
to focus primarily on compensatory relief, a range of remedies are commonly applied under 
international human rights law, including inter alia restitution, monetary compensation, 
rehabilitation (in the form of medical, psychological, social or legal services), satisfaction (relating 
directly to the nature of each violation), and non-repetition (directed at preventing future 
violations).48 
 
Notably, however, regional human rights courts and UN treaty bodies primarily accept complaints 
from natural persons, not legal entities. At the regional level, only the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) has consistently and explicitly allowed corporations to directly bring claims before 
the Court. Regional mechanisms also offer much narrower protections, if any, for minority and 
indirect shareholders, than protections enforced under ISDS.49 The distinction between the legal 
standing of investors under international human rights and investment law, respectively, should 
prompt a closer examination of whether and, if so, why investors as a specific group of claimants 
merit a higher level of protection at the international level than that available to all natural (and in 
some cases legal) persons under human rights law. Nevertheless, while human rights protections for 
legal entities are limited, human rights frameworks could be used to address a subset of harms 
individuals and, in some contexts, firms, may face when investing and operating abroad.  
 
Another limitation of human rights mechanisms as compared to ISDS is that international human 
rights law does not tend to protect property and other economic interests to the same extent as 
ISDS. While compensation requirements for expropriation exist under the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) and American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) does not explicitly require compensation for 
legal takings of property.50 Furthermore, in applying the requirements under the ECHR, the ECtHR 
has often deferred to national authorities with respect to compensation, and has also tended to 
consider the nature of the public interest underlying the taking in determining the quantum.51 
Similarly, the ECtHR tends to engage in a balancing assessment between public and private 
interests when determining compensation for indirect expropriations.52 By contrast, investment 
tribunals have tended to focus more singularly on the impact of the alleged indirect expropriation 
																																																								
47 See e.g., ACHR, art. 25 and ECHR arts. 13 and 41. For further information on remedies under human rights 
law, see e.g., Olivier De Schutter, International Human Rights Law (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 
2014), at Chapter 8.  
48 See United Nations General Assembly ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law’ 21 March 2006 A/RES/60/147. With respect to the ECtHR, note that the 
Court’s determinations generally consist of declaratory judgments that establish breaches of the ECHR, 
coupled with damages. The principle of subsidiarity not only requires exhaustion of local remedies to ensure 
that domestic courts have an opportunity to address alleged violations, but also that the measures necessary 
for execution of the Court’s judgments (other than monetary compensation) are often left for determination 
by the respondent date as supervised by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.  
49 See e.g., Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs, Jeffrey Sachs, ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Public Interest and 
US Domestic Law’ (2015) CCSI Policy Paper < http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/05/Investor-State-
Dispute-Settlement-Public-Interest-and-U.S.-Domestic-Law-FINAL-May-19-8.pdf> accessed 1 April 2019; 
David Gaukrodger, ‘Investment Treaties As Corporate Law: Shareholder Claims And Issues Of Consistency’ 
(2013) OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2013/3 < www.oecd.org/investment/investment-
policy/WP-2013_3.pdf> accessed 1 April 2019; Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Is the European Court of Human Rights 
an Alternative to Investor-State Arbitration?’ (2009) 1 Transnational Dispute Management.  
50 Lorenzo Cotula, Human Rights, Natural Resource and Investment Law in a Globalised World: Shades of 
Grey in the Shadow of the Law (Routledge 2012) 45, 63-66.  
51 Cotula (2012), supra n. 50, at 65.  
52 Cotula (2012), supra n. 50, 67-68.  
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on the investor.53 These and other factors may account for the higher levels of compensation 
generally awarded by investment tribunals as compared to the amounts awarded by human rights 
tribunals.54  
 
Furthermore, there is a legitimate position that human rights fora should not be used or relied upon 
for the benefit of corporate interests because the origin of human rights as a matter of dignity differs 
from the origins of corporate protection, corporate interests already wield immense power at the 
global and local levels, and funneling such disputes through human rights fora may further burden 
an already over-burdened system, thereby undermining access to justice for non-investor 
individuals and groups. 
 
Resort to human rights mechanisms is therefore only likely to be appropriate in very limited 
circumstances where host states are alleged to have committed grave or systemic violations of the 
rights of investors as individuals or, in the case of the ECHR, as legal entities. Nonetheless, this 
alternative is important to consider among the mix of instruments and tools that investors can use 
to protect their rights and pursue remedies, and that codify, establish, and seek to enforce relevant 
international norms of state conduct.  
Conclusion 
 
As has been discussed widely elsewhere, ISDS can be very costly with very few proven benefits.55 
The alternatives set forth here, especially when used in concert, have the ability to address many 
of the objectives envisioned for ISDS without the same costs. Eliminating ISDS does not raise 
perils of gunboat diplomacy, where legalized dispute settlement is replaced by use of power and 
force. Investors would still be able to secure compensation for unlawful government conduct, while 
preserving respect for the rule of law, international obligations, and broad rights of access to justice. 
These alternatives, alone and together, do not necessarily serve each of the four often stated 
objectives of ISDS to the same extent as ISDS does. The alternatives may outperform ISDS in some 
areas but underperform in others, such as in the case of providing compensation to corporations for 
economic losses. It is worth noting, however, that the oft-stated objectives of ISDS may themselves 
be outdated and would benefit from a refresh; as noted extensively above and in our companion 
piece on ISDS objectives, depoliticization should not be a primary objective, nor should efforts to 
incentivize all kinds of cross-border financial flows, or to offer broad protections for the economic 
interests of investors. The globally-agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) may provide a 
more useful framework for updating the objectives, and assessing the impacts of IIAs and their 
dispute settlement mechanisms on those aims. Nevertheless, whether from the perspective of the 
traditional or revisited objectives, it is valuable to consider the benefits and costs of each alternative 
mechanism for resolving disputes, and whether and how they could be utilized to better catalyze 
and govern international investment than the ISDS model pursued in recent decades.  
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